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Frank Maas. The Price of Alliance: The Politics and Procurement of
Leopard Tanks for Canada’s NATO Brigade. Vancouver: University
of British Columbia Press, 2017. Pp. 170.
“Defence procurement,” political scientist Kim Richard Nossal has
written with considerable understatement, “is not something that
Canadians do well.”1 From the historic cases of the Ross rifle and
the Avro Arrow to the modern Sea King helicopter replacement and
the Victoria-class submarine purchase to the ongoing F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter controversy, Canadian defence policy is replete with
mismanaged, drawn-out, costly, and politically volatile weapons
acquisition processes. One would think there would be a considerable
literature devoted to procurement because of this but there is not.
Fortunately, University of British Columbia Press, through its
excellent Studies in Canadian Military History series, is addressing
that gap. Frank Maas has made a well-researched and revealing
contribution to this literature with his work on the political and
military decision-making behind the procurement of Leopard 1 tanks
for 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (hereafter the Brigade),
Canada’s Cold War contribution to the defence of Western Europe.2
There is a famous story about a 1910 meeting between British
General Henry Wilson and French General Ferdinand Foch,
commanders of their respective country’s staff colleges. “What is the
smallest British military force that would be of practical assistance
to you?” Wilson is purported to have asked Foch about a future war
with Germany. Foch quipped “A single British soldier – and we will
see to it that he is killed.”3 It could be argued that the Brigade played
1  
Kim Richard Nossal, Charlie Foxtrot: Fixing Defence Procurement in Canada
(Toronto: Dundurn, 2016), 19-20. This is a concise and incisive overview of
everything that is wrong with procurement in Canada.
2  
The two other admirable works on procurement from the series are Aaron
Plamondon, The Politics of Procurement: Military Acquisition in Canada and the
Sea King Helicopter (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010); and
Randall Wakelam, Cold War Fighters: Canadian Aircraft Procurement, 1945-1954
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2011). For a military focused
history of the Brigade, see Sean Maloney, War Without Battles: Canada’s NATO
Brigade in Europe 1951-1993 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1997). For
the less military inclined, an excellent and more readable account that covers the
years Maas does not is Isabel Campbell, Unlikely Diplomats: The Canadian Brigade
in Germany, 1951-64 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2013).
3  
Margaret MacMillan, ed., Barbara W. Tuchman: The Guns of August. The Proud
Tower (New York: Library of America, 2012), 64.
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a similar role in Europe to that single British soldier, and Canadian
defence policy often appeared to Europe to constitute a search for the
smallest force that would be of practical assistance. Though no one
questioned the professionalism of Canada’s military, its size meant that
its contribution to the collective security of Europe was more symbolic
than real, and therefore of more political than military value. But
the continued presence of the Brigade on the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation’s (NATO) central front, where its survival prospects in
the event of a full-scale Soviet armoured thrust were bleak, nevertheless
reassured European allies that North America remained committed
to their defence. Europeans, “[w]anting the ‘cash’ of forward deployed
troops, cared little for the ‘credit’ of additional troops in Canada” (p.
5). The Brigade in turn gave Canada some voice in alliance affairs, but
as Maas notes, if the presence of the Brigade bought Canada a seat at
the table, tanks were the club dues.
By the late 1960s, the Brigade’s Centurion tanks were maintenance
nightmares shortly to reach the end of their service lives, and the
debate over their replacement vexed civil-military decision-makers.4
Maas describes the debate as a battle waged between “traditionalists”
and “revisionists.” The traditionalists—the Departments of National
Defence (DND) and External Affairs, supporters of NATO in Cabinet,
and Canada’s NATO allies—argued for the retention of the Brigade in
Europe and equipping it with tanks to make a credible contribution to
NATO in support of alliance cohesion and solidarity. The revisionists
tended to be civilians, mainly in Cabinet, who were skeptical of
the scale of Canada’s NATO commitment given Europe’s postwar
economic recovery and ability to defend themselves, and critical of
the scale of the Canadian defence budget, so much of which was being
spent in Europe. They argued for a reduced and restructured NATO
contribution, perhaps with a deployment away from NATO’s central
front, or even withdrawal of Canadian forces from Europe entirely.
In the revisionists’ view, tanks were only required for the defence of
Europe and not of Canada, and they should be replaced with a Direct
Fire Support Vehicle (DFSV)—smaller, lighter, and air-transportable

4  
Canada did seriously contemplate simply refurbishing the Centurions to squeeze
more life out of them. The Israelis after all had upgraded their Centurions into
formidable fighting machines. Though this was a potentially cost-effective solution, it
was rejected primarily over parts availability and interoperability as no other NATO
ally would remain a Centurion user.

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol28/iss1/6
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from Canada (which tanks were not); more useful for lower intensity
operations within and outside of NATO (such as peacekeeping); and
decidedly cheaper.
Though debate about what to do about the Brigade and whether
it would be equipped with heavy or light vehicles began under the
Liberal government of Prime Minister Lester Pearson in the wake of
the 1964 Defence White Paper, discussion at the time was dominated
by the traditionalists and little change was contemplated. It was
only after Pierre Trudeau, a committed revisionist, came to power in
1968 that the traditionalists found their influence curtailed. After a
defence review in 1969, Trudeau announced that the Brigade would
be reduced in size and the Centurions would be replaced by DFSVs.
This decision that Canada was getting out of the tank business was
confirmed in the 1971 Defence White Paper and then confirmed
by Cabinet again in 1973 in the face of stiff internal resistance,
mostly from Chief of the Defence Staff Lieutenant-General Jacques
Dextraze and others in DND. In fact, Maas characterises the extent
of bureaucratic obstruction of the revisionists’ goals as bordering on
subversion of civilian control of the military. By 1975, after yet another
defence review, Trudeau altered course, and in 1976 Canada signed a
contract to purchase 128 Leopard tanks from West Germany (which,
according to Maas’ account, proceeded atypically in that it was a
highly successful procurement process, aided in no small measure by
German government and corporate efficiency).
What had happened to prompt Trudeau’s about-face? Maas
writes in his introduction that his book contributes to four fields:
“the analysis of Trudeau’s foreign and defence policies; Canada’s
relationships with its allies; Canadian defence procurement; and the
history of the army, particularly the Royal Canadian Armoured
Corps, during the Cold War” (p. 5). However, it is in the first two
areas where Maas makes his most important contribution as he reveals
the impact Canada’s NATO allies had on Trudeau. Maas shows that
Trudeau’s views evolved considerably over his time in office as he
interacted with American and particularly European policy makers
who were deeply worried about the precedent a reduction in Canada’s
commitment might set for other members of NATO. He came to be
persuaded of the value of the alliance and Canada’s military role in
it, symbolic though it might mainly be. It was West Germany which
exerted the most influence due to the close personal relationship
Trudeau developed with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. As Ivan Head,
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Trudeau’s principal foreign policy advisor at this time, described it,
Schmidt’s views had a profound effect on Trudeau:
A German farmer is not able to detect the identity of a NATO aircraft
flying overhead as their contrails stream behind them. Besides, he
knows that those aircraft can flee westward as quickly as they can fly
eastward. He recognizes the maple leaf on tanks and infantry vehicles,
however, and knows that there is no escape for them in the event of
war. These units are reassuring and important, whether or not there is
a persuasive military role for them (p. 91).5

As a result, Trudeau shifted camps from the revisionists to the
traditionalists and his government subsequently embarked on a
large-scale recapitalisation of the Canadian Armed Forces. As Maas
concludes, Trudeau “made mistakes, but after 1975, he was a far
better prime minister for defence than scholarship or public opinion
would suggest, and his defence policy has been unfairly criticized”
(p. 132).
Maas addresses one persistent myth about the Leopards. Canada
has always been disappointed that support for NATO has not led
to greater economic linkages between Europe and Canada. After
all, Article 2 of the NATO Treaty was incorporated because of
Canada’s insistence that economic ties were as important a part of
collective security as defence ties. But Trudeau, pursuing a “Third
Option” to reduce economic dependence on the United States, found
he could not achieve a so-called “contractual link” with the European
Economic Community while simultaneously trying to reduce defence
commitments to Europe. The conventional wisdom regarding the
Leopard deal has been that Trudeau was forced to retreat from his
policies in the face of determined opposition from European allies
who were quite prepared to link their defence needs to Canada’s
economic ambitions. Schmidt is even rumoured to have bluntly told
Trudeau, “No tanks, no trade” (p. 105). However, Maas convincingly
argues that European economic linkages were more implicit than
explicit, and though they clearly influenced the decision on tanks, it
was not quite the case of extortion as has been claimed.
5  
Head’s relating of a comment Schmidt made to Trudeau, as quoted in Maas from
Ivan Head and Pierre Trudeau, The Canadian Way: Shaping Canada’s Foreign
Policy 1968-1984 (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1995), 273-4.
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Canada faced a somewhat similar situation in the 2000s when
its Leopards were reaching the end of their service lives. However,
the Army, no longer committed to Europe since withdrawal of the
Brigade in 1994, now argued that they did not need a tank given
the changed nature of combat in the twenty-first century. The
Liberal government of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien agreed to
purchase the American Stryker DFSV instead, itself derived from
the Canadian LAV III family of wheeled light armoured vehicles.
However, combat experience in Afghanistan, where Leopards were
deployed in support of Canadian troops (with debateable results),
convinced the Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen
Harper—spearheaded by a former tank commander Defence Minister
supported by armoured elements of the Army—that the tank still
had a role to play on a counterinsurgency battlefield. The DFSV idea
was shelved, and after a procurement process conducted at a speed
unheard of by Canadian standards, a replacement tank was selected
and delivered. The tank chosen: the German Leopard 2.6
russell isinger , university of saskatchewan

The Leopard 2 procurement decision is also worthy of academic attention. For one
point of view on the acquisition, see Michael Byers and Stuart Webb, Stuck in a
Rut: Harper Government Overrides Military, Insists on Buying Outdated Equipment
(Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives/Rideau Institute, 2013), https://
www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National%20
Office/2013/09/Stuck_in_a_Rut.pdf.

6  
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